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Abstract: This essay concerns the problematic of the access to Covid-19 treat-
ment at an international scale and the role of Intellectual Property Law. As in past 
public health outbreaks, one of the most raised questions is the possibility of patent 
holder’s rights being an obstacle to accessing treatment. Since the beginning of the 
pandemic, Compulsory Licensing has been presented as the Intellectual Property 
Law mechanism capable of guaranteeing Covid-19 treatment globally and effec-
tively. We propose to analyse this figure and its possible alternatives: Voluntary 
Licensing, Patent Pools and the Proposal to waive TRIPS Intellectual Property 
provision. We will then assess which is the most effective solution to overcome this 
humanitarian crisis without compromising the balance between the right to health 
and intellectual property rights.
Keywords: Intellectual Property Law; Covid-19; Compulsory Licenses; 
Patent Pools; Voluntary Licenses; Proposal to waive TRIPS Intellectual Property 
provisions. 
 
Resumo: O presente artigo incide sobre a problemática existente entre o acesso 
ao tratamento da COVID-19 e o Direito de Propriedade Intelectual a nível inter-
nacional. Tal como em epidemias anteriores, uma das questões mais debatidas é a 
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possibilidade dos direitos dos inventores constituírem um obstáculo ao acesso ao 
tratamento. Desde o início desta pandemia, as Licenças Compulsórias foram apre-
sentadas como o mecanismo capaz de garantir esse acesso de forma rápida e univer-
sal. Neste artigo propomo-nos a analisar esta figura legal e possíveis meios alterna-
tivos: Licenças Voluntárias, Patent Pools e até o Pedido de suspensão do Regime 
de Propriedade Intelectual do Acordo TRIPS. Após uma comparação, tentaremos 
desvendar qual a solução mais eficaz para se alcançar o fim desta crise humanitária 
sem colocar em causa o equilíbrio entre o direito à saúde e os direitos de propriedade 
intelectual. 
Palavras-chave: Direito da Propriedade Intelectual; Covid-19; Licenças 
Compulsórias; Patent Pools; Licenças Voluntárias; Pedido de suspensão do Regime 
de Propriedade Intelectual do Acordo TRIPS. 
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1. Introduction
Covid-19 pandemic knows no limits or borders: it is long-term locking 
down entire cities and devastating the world’s greatest economies. Research-
ers and inventors rushed to create treatments, medicines and devices capable 
of beating this global threat. In an extraordinary short period of time, vac-
cines were developed and are now being commercialized. 
Since its beginning, questions have been raised about the possibility of 
intellectual property law being an obstacle to stop this pandemic.
Discussion regarding the patent holder’s rights versus access to medicines is 
a topic now revisited: to encourage future innovation, society grants to inven-
tors exclusive rights in exchange for sharing their inventions. However, in these 
private monopolies, once the patents are granted, pharmaceutical companies 
control medicines prices and licenses. Those rights conferred to patentees af-
fects the production and, therefore, the accessibility to such treatments. 
This would normally impact low-income countries that are not capable of 
purchasing or producing these products, as in prior public health crises.1 How-
ever, due to the escalating devastation and spreading of this coronavirus, its treat-
ment is an essential good exponentially demanded, meaning all world nations 
may have difficulties to obtain it. Therefore, if patentees cannot produce enough 
medicines for 7,8 billion people, or do not allow others to produce them, how 
can governments guarantee its citizens’ fundamental right to health?
Compulsory licensing has been indicated as the solution for balancing the 
patentee rights and the public interest. This mechanism is believed to be the 
most effective in ensuring universal and cheap access to COVID-19 drugs 
and vaccines and its use has been encouraged.2 3
1 Katarina Foss-Solbrekk. “Safeguarding public health in the wake of hegemonic intellectual prop-
erty rights — Two means to this end?,” Stockholm Intellectual Property Law Review 2, no. 1 ( June 
2019): 80, http://www.stockholmiplawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Online_IP_nr-
1_2019_A4_Safeguarding-public-health.pdf
2 In the 73rd World Health Assembly, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended 
governments to make use of TRIPS Agreement flexibilities (moreover, Compulsory Licensing), 
World Health Organization, “Covid-19 response”, WHA73.1, May 19, 2020, https://apps.who.
int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA73/A73_R1-en.pdf.
3 In March 2020, Israel had already issued a compulsory patent license. Thiru, “Israel issues com-
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Nonetheless, many have raised concerns about granting compulsory li-
censes. Voluntary licensing, patent pools and even a Proposal for waiving 
TRIPS Intellectual Property Law provisions were presented as alternatives.
2. Compulsory Licenses
What is this legal mechanism of compulsory licensing? Compulsory Li-
censes were established in the Paris Convention of 18834 and regulated in 
detail in the TRIPS Agreement as an exemption to the rights conferred to 
the patent holder.5
Under a Compulsory License, the patentee must tolerate the exploitation 
of his invention by a third person or by the government itself when there is a 
public interest in broader access to the invention considered to be more im-
portant than the private interest of the patent holder exclusive rights.6 This 
public interest must be essential — an example, public health.7
Compulsory Licensing is an exceptional situation that must fulfil require-
ments. Article 31 TRIPS enumerates these preliminary conditions, stating 
pulsory license to allow the government to import generic versions of Kaletra”, Blog, Knowledge 
Ecology International, 2020, https://www.keionline.org/32503; Minister of Health of Israel, A Per-
mit to the State to Exploit an Invention, 2020, https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/A-
Permit-to-the-State-to-Exploit-an-Invention-Pursuant-to-Chapter-Six-Article-Three-of-the-Patents-
Law-5727-1967.pdf. Nevertheless, the patentee (AbbVie) announced that they would not enforce 
the patent (Phil Taylor, “AbbVie won’t enforce patents for COVID-19 drug candidate Kaletra,” Blog, 
Pharmaphorum, 2020,  https://pharmaphorum.com/news/abbvie-wont-enforce-patents-for-covid-
19-drug-candidate-kaletra/).
4 “Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,” (as amended on September 28, 
1979), Article 5, https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/287556 .
5 “Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,” (original version), Article 
31, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/31bis_trips_01_e.htm 
6 As stated by Jerome Reichman and Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-voluntary Licensing of Patented 
Inventions: Historical Perspectives, Legal Frameworks under Trips and an Overview of the Practice in 
Canada and in United States of America, 5 (Geneva: UNCTAD/ICTSD, 2002), 1, (PDF) Non-vol-
untary Licensing of Patented Inventions Historical Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS, and 
an Overview of the Practice in Canada and the USA (researchgate.net): Compulsory Licensing is 
“the practice by a government to authorise itself or third parties to use the subject matter of a patent 
without the authorisation of the right holder for reasons of public policy”.
7 Vítor Palmela Fidalgo, As Licenças Compulsórias de Direitos de Propriedade Intelectual (Lisbon: 
Almedina, 2016). 
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that to grant a license, a State must: provide adequate remuneration to the 
respective right holder; if not in the event of “a national emergency or other 
circumstance of extreme urgency”, it must attempt to negotiate a voluntary 
license with the right holder prior to issuing a compulsory one; use the pat-
ent solely for the purpose of its authorisation; authorise the Compulsory Li-
censing “predominantly for the supply of the domestic market”; construct 
the Compulsory Licensing to be non-exclusive and subject it to judicial re-
view. Nevertheless, these conditions are not obligatory if the license aims to 
remedy anti-competitive practices, as Article 31(k) TRIPS affirms.
Covid-19 pandemic is a situation of national emergency or extreme ur-
gency8 9, meaning countries will act lawfully, under Article 31(b) TRIPS, if 
they choose to use it. Until the Doha Declaration of 200110 and the 2003 
TRIPS Council Decision11, this figure only apparently protected public in-
terests, especially public health. Countries with little or no manufacturing 
capabilities (mostly, least developed countries), were unsure of how to use 
TRIPS flexibilities, as Compulsory Licenses.12 This issue was clearly visible 
in the previous HIV/AIDS outbreak in the late 1990s.13 
8 As stated in World Trade Organization, “Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public Health”, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, November 9-14, 2001, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/
min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf , Clause 5(c): “Each Member has the right to determine what consti-
tutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public 
health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can 
represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.” (bold by us). 
9 Hilary Wong, “The case for compulsory licensing during COVID-19,” Journal of Global Health 
10, No. 1, ( June 2020), http://www.jogh.org/documents/issue202001/jogh-10-010358.pdf . 
10 World Trade Organization, “Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public Health”.
11 General Council of the World Trade Organization, “Decision of the General Council of 30 
August 2003”, WT/L/540 and Corr.1, September 1, 2003,  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm.
12 “Despite the existence of CLs, countries with little or no local manufacturing capabilities were 
unable to produce drugs locally and at the same time prohibited from importing medicines under a 
license pursuant to Article 31(f ). For countries able to produce drugs, the prices offered under a CL 
were still not affordable. This issue escalated in the wake of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the late 1990s. 
During this time, the right to health appeared precarious as IPRs prevailed over individuals’ inability 
to access affordable drugs.” Foss-Solbrekk, “Safeguarding public health”:80.
13 Highlighting this, Mary K. Schug, “Promoting Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-
Saharan Africa within the Framework of International Intellectual Property Law,” Minnesota Journal 
of Law & Inequality 19 (2001), Promoting Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan 
Africa within the Framework of International Intellectual Property Law (umn.edu).
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In order to be useful, the legal regime needed interpretation and so, in 
2001, the Doha Declaration refined it, clarifying that TRIPS must be in-
terpreted in light of the obligations surrounding the right to health and re-
affirmed Members’ right to utilise TRIPS flexibilities to circumvent intel-
lectual property rights (IPRs) for improving access to medicines. Moreover, 
TRIPS Council reached a decision of adopting Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration in 200314, which establishes that least developed countries and 
other countries lacking manufacturing capacities can import drugs under a 
Compulsory License.15 This Decision was incorporated into TRIPS as the 
new ‘Article 31bis’ in January of 201716, providing exceptions, especially to 
article 31(f ). Article 31(f ) is a provision which requires that any Compul-
sory License granted by World Trade Organization (WTO) Members must 
be “predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member au-
thorizing such use”. Now, 31bis permits WTO Members’ to grant a “special” 
Compulsory License for export without that limitation. 
However, difficulties remained: WTO Members continue to dissuade 
the use of Compulsory Licenses, since the Declaration failed to mediate the 
tensions between them and the procedural and political difficulties of em-
ploying compulsory licensing inhabit now not only in Article 31 but also in 
31bis. This new article presents, among others, preliminary notification re-
quirements, obliging importing and exporting countries to notify the TRIPS 
Council of their intent to issue/grant a Compulsory License, to specify the 
characteristics of the products — name, quantities, etc — and of the impor-
tation/exportation, information that shall be published and available online.
Notwithstanding, the grounds for issuing Compulsory Licenses remain 
at the discretion of States themselves17, that must enact legislation to imple-
14 General Council of the World Trade Organization, “Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003”.
15 World Trade Organization, “Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public Health,” paragraph 
6: “We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the phar-
maceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the 
TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this prob-
lem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.”
16 “Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” (as amended on January 
23, 2017), https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/31bis_trips_01_e.htm.
17 Paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration manifests that each member retains “the freedom to determine 
the grounds upon which such licenses are granted,” provided that Article 31 requirements are adhered to.
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ment their provisions. As a consequence, compulsory regimes differ from 
State to State, since governments can determine autonomously the scope of 
the procedural conditions and the grounds for issuance.18 These grounds also 
vary due to bilateral and multilateral free-trade agreements (FTAs) signed 
between States, which usually restrict those grounds and lead to the adop-
tion of stronger Intellectual Property standards. 
This is a main disadvantage of this TRIPS flexibility. Properly regulating 
Compulsory Licenses at the national level is essential for its usefulness and 
effectiveness. 
Moreover, high income countries face another considerable problem. Al-
though Article 31bis TRIPS is not perfect, it is considered the only solution 
for the export restriction of 31(f ). Nevertheless, Australia, Canada, Europe-
an Union, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the Unit-
ed States unilaterally committed not to subscribe this system as importers19, 
even in situations of national emergency/extreme urgency. This impacts not 
only the affordability and access to generic medicines in these countries, but 
since the economies of scale that could have been harnessed by exporting to 
them are curtailed, the price of the generic medicines that could be produced 
for other WTO Members may be higher.20 
Many have appealed to these countries to reconsider this decision.21 How-
ever, can high income countries opt-back into Article 31bis system? It has 
been stated that members have the option “to modify their status as users 
18 Studies reveal how the basis for granting a Compulsory License varies depending on national 
laws. Carolyn Deere, “The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics of 
Intellectual Property Reform,” (Oxford University Press, 2009): 92-93, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1405224; and WIPO, “Survey on Compulsory Licenses Granted by WIPO 
Members to Address Anti-Competitive Uses of Intellectual Property,” CDIP/4/4/REV.Study/INF/5, 
October 4, 2011, Table 2, https://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=187423. 
19  General Council, “Decision,” Article 1(b), footnote 3.
20 Presenting a complete explanation of this situation, Christopher Garrison, “Never say never — 
Why the High Income Countries that opted-out from the Art. 31bis WTO TRIPS system must ur-
gently reconsider their decision in the face of the Covid-19 pandemic,” Blog, Medicines Law & Policy, 
April 8, 2020, https://medicineslawandpolicy.org/2020/04/never-say-never-why-the-high-income-coun-
tries-that-opted-out-from-the-art-31bis-wto-trips-system-must-urgently-reconsider-their-decision-in-
the-face-of-the-covid-19-pandemic/ . 
21 James Love, “Open letter asking 37 WTO Members to declare themselves eligible to import 
medicines manufactured under compulsory license in another country, under 31bis of TRIPS Agree-
ment”, Blog, Knowledge Ecology International, April 7, 2020, https://www.keionline.org/32707.
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of the system at any time” and the Decision of Implementing Paragraph 6 
“does not seem to prohibit members that opted out from opting back in”22, 
although some disagree.23 Nevertheless, the global emergency seems enough 
justification. 
In the case of European Union, challenges double. First of all, there is 
no compulsory licensing general regime in the EU. The EU Regulation 
on Compulsory Licensing relating to Pharmaceuticals states that Com-
pulsory Licenses can only be granted by individual EU Member States by 
their competent authorities under national patent law and only for their 
specific territories.24 Moreover, opting out of the Decision meant that the 
EU cannot import pharmaceutical products produced under a Compul-
sory License in third countries but also in other EU Member States.25 This 
means that, if the EU does not revisit its decision to opt-out, its Member 
States “have to rely on their own domestic production of pharmaceuticals 
and vaccines”.26 27
If the access to COVID-19 treatments can be so problematic in high in-
come countries, difficulties are even greater in low-income nations. Neverthe-
less, past outbreaks conclusions show that Compulsory Licensing has always 
been pointed out as a relevant tool to be used by both developed and least 
22 Weinian Hu, Compulsory Licensing and Access to Future Covid-19 Vaccines, 2 (Brussels: CEPS, 2020), 
https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/compulsory-licensing-and-access-to-future-covid-
19-vaccines/. 
23 Frederick M. Abbott, “The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the 
Protection of Public Health”, The American Journal of International Law 99, (2005): 336, https://
www.who.int/intellectualproperty/submissions/Abbott%20proofs.pdf. 
24 Regulation (EC) No 816/2006 of 17 May 2006 on compulsory licensing of patents relating to 
the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for export to countries with public health problems, 
Article 3, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006R0816&f
rom=EN
25 EU Regulation on Compulsory Licensing relating to Pharmaceuticals, Article 13.
26 Caranina Colpaert, “Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceuticals in the EU: A Reality Check”, 
Blog, Bill of Health, October 21, 2020, https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/21/com-
pulsory-licensing-eu-pharma/ .
27 Data exclusivity and subjective scope are possible blocks to the effective use of Compulsory Li-
cense as well. Nonetheless, the exclusivity of data can be dismissed by a waiver provided in Article 18 
and questions regarding who can take the initiative of granting the Compulsory License can be an-
swered by Article 6, both of the EU Regulation on Compulsory Licensing relating to Pharmaceuticals. 
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developed countries because they increase drug supply and decrease prices.28 
However, countries usually shy away from it, not only because of FTAs, but 
also because they fear trade retaliation and Compulsory Licenses’ compli-
cated nature that may lead to complex and lengthy judicial procedures.29 
For all the disadvantages presented, and because of the urgent nature of 
this pandemic, many have argued that Compulsory Licensing is not an ef-
fective way to provide COVID-19 treatment globally. Due to its rules ap-
plying only on a case-by-case and product-by-product basis, it is believed its 
use will slow down the ability of countries to scale up production of needed 
COVID-19 medical products.30
3. Alternatives to compulsory licensing 
There are different alternatives to Compulsory Licensing, now spotlight-
ing Patent Pools and Voluntary Licenses. 
3. 1.  Patent pools
C-TAP and Open Covid Pledge are two examples of currently active Pat-
ent Pools.31 
28 As stated in Médecins Sans Frontières, A Fair Shot for Vaccine Affordability: Understanding and 
addressing the effects of patents on access to newer vaccines (Geneva: Médecins Sans Frontières, Septem-
ber 2017): 18, https://msfaccess.org/fair-shot-vaccine-affordability: “The use of compulsory licences 
has proven to be an effective way of overcoming patent barriers to access critical health products and 
could also be employed as a threat by governments in their price negotiations.”
29 This was noted especially in the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Hilary Wong, “The case for compulsory 
licensing,” 2.
30 As stated by Ronald Labonte and Mira Johri, “COVID-19 drug and vaccine patents are put-
ting profit before people”, Blog, The Conversation, November 5, 2020, https://theconversation.com/
covid-19-drug-and-vaccine-patents-are-putting-profit-before-people-149270. 
31 “WHO Covid-19 Technology Access Pool”, World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/
emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/global-research-on-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov/
covid-19-technology-access-pool and Open Covid Pledge, https://opencovidpledge.org/. 
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Patent Pools compile data on clinical trials, technologies, and other 
essential information for the development of a treatment. They allow 
companies and governments to legally rely on the knowledge provided 
by other companies about patented inventions placed in the Pool under 
an open license.
Many believe they encourage and motivate innovators and simultaneously 
secure equal and affordable access to medicines.32 Patent Pools do not force 
pharmaceutical companies into Compulsory Licensing but instead negotiate 
with patentees for public-health driven licenses. They are indicated as being 
more effective in terms of time as well. 
Patent Pools lower transaction costs, reduce both litigation and the ex-
pense of negotiation with a myriad of patent holders, but most importantly, 
facilitate innovation. 
Its disadvantages mainly concern their creation (long time for forma-
tion and difficulties to find patent administrators), the possibilities of 
leading to competition law violations and the requirement for an in-
dependent expert to evaluate the member’s patents. Moreover, Patent 
Pools are only useful if companies voluntarily participate and contribute 
to the pool. 
3. 2. Voluntary licenses
Patent Pools and Compulsory Licensing both promote another alterna-
tive, preferred by patentees: voluntary licenses.
This alternative is a “private contractual agreement between right holders 
and second parties, which stipulate the terms and conditions for the entry 
of particular medicines in a designated market”.33 They are not subject to 
Article 31 TRIPS. The parties — generic firms, States or Patent Pools and 
32 For example, the UN-funded Medicines Patent Pool was a very special tool to improve the ac-
cess to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria treatments. Medicines Patent Pool, Annual Report 2016: 
Expanding for Better Treatment Options, (Geneva: Medicines Patent Pool, 2016), https://annual-re-
port-2016.medicinespatentpool.org/ .
33 Peter Beyer, “Developing Socially Responsible Intellectual Property Licensing Policies: Non-
exclusive Licensing Initiatives in the Pharmaceutical Sector,” in Research Handbook on Intellectual 
Property Licensing, ed. Jacques de Werra (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013): 228.
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patentees (typically pharmaceutical companies) — negotiate the terms such 
as royalties, exclusivities and geographical preferences. 
In the past, many companies licensed their products voluntarily34, primar-
ily through the Medicines Patent Pool and bilateral agreements. Currently, 
Gilead has already signed Voluntary Licenses with generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturers based in Egypt, India and Pakistan to expand supply on a 
medicine believed to be effective in COVID-19 treatment.35
This type of license also reduces treatment costs, therefore benefiting the 
national economy by boosting savings and stimulating the local generic in-
dustry. With the local production, inventors may see their drugs being im-
proved by new formulations, which incentivises future licensing discussions 
and strengthens a relationship (that is usually strained), building good-will 
between generic firms and pharmaceutical companies.
Notwithstanding, all this depends on the agreed terms and conditions. 
Bilateral Voluntary Licenses’ agreements have been criticized for lack of 
transparency, since they are (contrary to Patent Pools’ Voluntary Licenses) 
confidential, which may lead to second parties allowing more restrictive pro-
visions unknowingly.36 High royalties rates and geographical exclusions are 
also negative possibilities. Altogether, such disadvantages can have the ad-
verse desired effect: impede access to medicines. 
Voluntary Licenses granted under Patent Pools are, at least, more trans-
parent, which means the use of this mechanism to access treatment to CO-
VID-19, with balanced terms and conditions, would fulfil the preferences 
of patentees and promote public health. Nonetheless, Patent Pools are not 
very popular. Both the pharmaceutical industry and the wealthiest countries 
opted out of Patent Pools.37 
34 Access to Medicine Foundation, Access to Medicine Index 2016 Overall Ranking, (Haarlem: 
Access to Medicine Foundation, 2016): 8-11, 63-77, https://accesstomedicinefoundation.org/
publications/2016-access-to-medicine-index; K D Raju, “Compulsory v Voluntary Licensing: A Le-
gitimate way to Enhance Access to Essential Medicines in Developing Countries”, Journal of Intellec-
tual Property Rights 22, ( January 2017): 27.
35 “Voluntary Licensing Agreements for Remdesivir”, Gilead, 2020, https://www.gilead.com/pur-
pose/advancing-global-health/covid-19/voluntary-licensing-agreements-for-remdesivir. 
36 Foss-Solbrekk, “Safeguarding public health,” 88.
37 Mari Serebrov, “Biopharma opts for collaboration, not patent pools”, Blog, BioWorld, August 25, 
2020, https://www.bioworld.com/articles/496984-biopharma-opts-for-collaboration-not-patent-
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3.3. Waiving TRIPS Intellectual Property Rights provisions
This no-cooperative behaviour from the powered actors led India and 
South Africa to present before World Trade Organization (WTO), in Oc-
tober 2020, a proposal to waive the TRIPS Intellectual Property Law pro-
visions for COVID-19 related medical technologies during the current 
pandemic38. Signed by most least developed countries, developing countries 
and intergovernmental and international organizations39, which believe this 
waiver will eliminate the problems of TRIPS flexibilities, such as vaccine in-
equality access and time-intensiveness. These flexibilities are believed not to 
be sufficient to answer the pandemic.40
For example, one main argument is that the waiver offers easy access not 
only to patents, but to copyrights and industrial designs, which are not in-
cluded in Compulsory Licensing flexibility. As affirmed by Carlos Correa, 
the waiver will address all the existent problems of access to medicines alto-
gether, the limitations and pressures Compulsory Licensing system do not 
resolve and may even deepen.41 
Nonetheless big pharmaceutical and wealthiest countries are opponents 
of the proposal.42 Arguments presented state that the obstacles are not intel-
lectual property rights, but the lack of the essential means to production — 
facilities, infrastructures and know-how —, meaning that even if the TRIPS 
pools, and Ed Silverman, “The WHO launched a voluntary COVID-19 product pool. What hap-
pens next?”, Blog, STAT, May 29, 2020, https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/05/29/who-
covid19-coronavirus-patents/ .
38 World Trade Organization, “Waiver From Certain Provisions Of The Trips Agreement 
For The Prevention, Containment And Treatment Of Covid-19”, IP/C/W/669, October 
2, 2020, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669.
pdf&Open=True
39 Médicines Sans Frontières, India and South Africa proposal for WTO waiver from intellectual 
property protections for COVID-19 related medical technologies, (Geneva:  Médicines Sans Frontières, 
November 18, 2020): 2.
40 Médicines Sans Frontières, “WTO COVID-19 TRIPS waiver proposal“ : 4, https://msfaccess.
org/sites/default/files/2020-12/COVID_TechBrief_MSF_AC_IP_TRIPSWaiverMythsRealities_
ENG_Dec2020.pdf .
41 Andrew Green. “At WTO, a battle for access to COVID-19 vaccines,” Devex, December 15, 
2020, https://www.devex.com/news/at-wto-a-battle-for-access-to-covid-19-vaccines-98787 
42 Médicines Sans Frontières, “TRIPS waiver proposal”. 
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Waiver is accepted, the complex manufacturing required to develop the vac-
cine would not yet exist in developing countries, and even in some high in-
come countries, meaning that the issue of under-supply would persist.43 
Moreover, if this Proposal is approved, incentive to future innovation may 
disappear and companies will stop sharing valuable patents, technologies 
and trade secrets. High income countries argue that “equitable access can 
be achieved through voluntary licensing, technology transfer arrangements, 
and the donor-funded COVAX Advance Market Commitment44 for vac-
cines” and even the WHO Solidarity Trial of COVID-19 treatments’ Chair-
men agrees that the patent waiver is a “wrong approach”.45 
Indeed, at first sight, the optimal solution for our problematic would be 
for companies to voluntarily given up of their Intellectual Property Rights, 
as Moderna, who will not enforce its patents and will license its COVID-
19-related patents  with other vaccine manufacturers.46 Nevertheless, phar-
maceutical industries cannot be obliged to take this conduct. 
4. Conclusion
Considering the options presented above, although the Proposal of TRIPS 
Waiver would be a good solution for the present pandemic, it can compro-
43 Katie Gallogly-Swan, “TRIPing Up: Why Global Access to the Covid-19 Vaccine Lies with 
the WTO”, Blog, Global Development Policy Center, December 22, 2020, https://www.bu.edu/
gdp/2020/12/22/tripping-up-why-global-access-to-the-covid-19-vaccine-lies-with-the-wto/ 
44 According to WHO (“COVAX”, World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/initiatives/
act-accelerator/covax) and GAVI (“COVAX explained”, GAVI, https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/
covax-explained?gclid=Cj0KCQjwmIuDBhDXARIsAFITC_6gfMTnncqc1qyeF0c_0tmHiYe1j5-
B1Elf4IUntXrweGWhXoX9_P8aAg8GEALw_wcB), COVAX is the vaccines pillar of the Access 
to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, “a ground-breaking global collaboration to accelerate the 
development, production, and equitable access to COVID-19 tests, treatments, and vaccines”, and 
COVAX aims to “accelerate the development and manufacture of COVID-19 vaccines, and to guar-
antee fair and equitable access for every country in the world” by “acting as a platform that will support 
the research, development and manufacturing of a wide range of COVID-19 vaccine candidates, and 
negotiate their pricing”. As stated by Serebrov, “Biopharma”: “Instead of pooling patents, COVAX 
offers a procurement mechanism”.
45 Gallogly-Swan, “TRIPing UP”.
46 Robert Langreth and Susan Decker, “Moderna Won’t Enforce Covid Vaccine Patents During Pan-
demic”, Blog, Bloomberg, October 8, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-08/
moderna-won-t-enforce-patents-on-covid-vaccines-during-pandemic .
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mise future (and very probable) health crises. The right to health shall out-
weigh intellectual property rights but not excessively. The Intellectual Prop-
erty system is required to incentivise new inventions on biomedicine, which 
might dry up in its absence.47 Inventors may reconsider their participation in 
future disease outbreaks battles if their rights are easily neglected. Moreover, 
even if it is approved, its effective fulfilment will depend entirely on the will 
and actions of the WTO Member States.48
Nevertheless, the Proposal is still waiting to be revisited by WTO49 and 
meanwhile, governments must take action. 
Inventors and investors on biotechnology industry do not opt for Patent 
Pools or subscribe this proposal50 and ask for collaboration instead. Volun-
tary licenses are their preference. However, this legal mechanism may lead 
to difficulties on the access to medicines, if patentees contractual stipulation 
freedom is wider. 
In our opinion, Patent Pools would be the perfect fit, since they are 
the most effective solution in terms of time, their main disadvantages 
were already surpassed and they would promote transparent Voluntary 
Licenses. However, if patentees do not adhere, it is a mechanism just as 
effective as WTO Members without national legislation on Compulsory 
Licensing. 
Taking these statements into consideration, we conclude that if Compul-
sory Licensing issues are surpassed — which they can be if countries improve 
their regimes and opt-back into 31bis TRIPS — this figure may be the best 
47 Ann Danaiya Usher, “South Africa and India push for COVID-19 patents ban”, The Lancet 
396, no. 10265 (December 2020), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736(20)32581-2/fulltext .
48 As stated by Praharsh Gour, “Wishful Thinking? Analyzing India and South Africa’s Joint State-
ment to Waive Key Provisions of TRIPS — Part II”, Blog, Spicy IP, October 20, 2020, https://spicyip.
com/2020/10/wishful-thinking-analyzing-india-and-south-africas-joint-statement-to-waive-key-
provisions-of-trips-part-ii.html . 
49 World Trade Organization, “Members to continue discussion on proposal for temporary IP 
waiver in response to COVID-19”, December 10, 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news20_e/trip_10dec20_e.htm .
50 As Pascal Soriot affirms: “IP is a fundamental part of our industry. And if you don’t protect IP, 
then essentially there’s no incentive for anybody to innovate.” In his words, it was because of strong IP 
that the biopharma industry was robust and able to respond so quickly to a global pandemic. Serebrov, 
“Biopharma”. 
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general solution. If not, at least Compulsory Licenses are an essential plan B 
that countries should not be afraid to adopt. 
Despite being considered a threat and very complex to be perfect, Com-
pulsory Licensing is a way to escape expropriation and also to promote Vol-
untary Licenses that favour both parties51: if States threaten pharmaceutical 
companies with Compulsory Licenses, patentees will try to negotiate for 
Voluntary Licenses with better prices and conditions. 
At the end of the day, Compulsory Licensing is still the recommended 
option.52 The problems of time and inequality in access to vaccines due to 
national Compulsory Licenses’ laws is already being surpassed by some: since 
March, many nations amended national regimes to facilitate its process and 
remove potential roadblocks. This was the case of Australia, Canada53, Ger-
many54, Hungary and France. Others have passed resolutions to encourage it, 
such as Ecuador55 and Chile56.
If no other alternative is presented, Compulsory Licensing continues to be 
the option that is safer and that allows access to all countries, independently 
of their economic power, to medicines, since States can use them whenever 
they understand necessary to their citizens (as long as the requirements are 
fulfilled). At the same time, the rights of the patent’s holder are properly re-
51 Stating that promoting voluntary licenses is the main objective of compulsory licenses, Fidalgo, 
“Licenças Compulsórias”. 
52 Recommending compulsory licenses instead of voluntary licenses: Médecins Sans Frontières, 
“Voluntary licenses and access to medicines”, (October 2020): 3, https://msfaccess.org/voluntary-
licenses-access-medicines .
53 “Canada notifies WTO on Bill C-13 to facilitate compulsory licensing in the COVID-19 re-
sponse”, Blog, Knowledge Ecology International, April 26, 2020, https://www.keionline.org/32837 . 
54 WIPO, “Germany: Act on the Protection of the Population in the Event of an Epidemic Si-
tuation of National Importance”, March 27, 2020, https://www.wipo.int/news/en/wipolex/2020/
article_0008.html .
55 Comisión de Educación, Cultura y Ciencia y Tecnología, “Resolución para requerir al Gobierno Na-
cional el establecimiento de licencias obligatorias y otras medidas que permitan garantizar el acceso gratuito 
y a costos asequibles de los productos farmacéuticos y tecnologías médicas en la Declaratoria de Emergencia 
Sanitaria por la pandemia del Coronavirus (COVID-19) y demás variaciones, así como los protocolos e ins-
trumentos de bioseguridad para el personal de salud, posgradistas y estudiante del Sistema de salud público”, 
March 20, 2020, https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/ES-Ecuador-CL-resolution.pdf.
56 “Proyecto de Resolución para el otorgamiento de Licencias No Voluntarias Contempladas en 
el Artículo 51 Nº2 de la Ley Nº 19.030 de Propiedad Industrial para Facilitar el Acceso y Disponi-
bilidad a los Medicamentos y Tecnologías para la Prevención, Tratamiento y Cura del Coronavirus 
COVID-19”, https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/resolucioncoronavirus.pdf. 
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spected. Moreover, there is no need to wait for a voluntary decision and the 
existent rights are balanced. 
Overall, we can conclude that this discussion reveals that a reform of 
International Intellectual Property Law, especially TRIPS, is needed more 
than ever.57 TRIPS flexibility provisions are only a limited solution, with 
many complications. Health crises will continue to exist and measures must 
be taken to prepare national and international legislation to effectively ad-
dress them. 
International cooperation, rather than division, is the key to surpass this 
global emergency in the most effective way without deeply compromising 
intellectual property rights to a point where there is no more incentive for 
innovation and inventiveness. Protecting them in this pandemic is necessary 
to ensure that, in future crises, industry and investors will be, once again, 
rushing to find solutions. However, these parties shall also make their part 
and understand the importance of their actions to the universal and pres-
ently affected right to health. 
57 Mentioning the need for a reform: Sir Colin Birss’ MIP International Patent Forum spee-
ch, as highlighted by Christian Dekoninck et al., “COVID-19 and public compulsory licensing 
of drugs in Europe”, Blog, Taylor Wessing, April 17, 2020, https://www.taylorwessing.com/fr/
insights-and-events/insights/2020/04/covid-19-and-public-compulsory-licensing-of-drugs-in-
-europe;  Carlos Correa, as presented in Gallogly-Swan, “TRIPing UP,”. 
